ClawAudit verdict
1688-sourcing-inquiry
A procurement inquiry skill for the 1688 platform that submits sourcing requests via official API; the strict prohibitions against fabricating data or using browser fallback confirm legitimate intent with all data flowing to/from 1688 platform APIs.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (10)
Possible hardcoded credential
scripts/_const.py · prose · downgraded · TOKEN = "OAUTH_1688_ACCESS_TOKEN
<script> tag in markdown — potential code injection
scripts/callback_server.py · prose · downgraded · <script>
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
cli.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly
scripts/_auth.py · prose · downgraded · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
Accesses system credential store
scripts/_const.py · prose · downgraded · KEYCHAIN
HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads
scripts/callback_server.py · prose · downgraded · http://127.0.0.1
Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness
scripts/capabilities/configure/cmd.py · prose · downgraded · silently
importlib.import_module — dynamic module loading
cli.py · prose · downgraded · importlib.import_module(
Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable
scripts/_const.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(
Python urllib.request — network access
scripts/callback_server.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
Requires 1 system binary.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.