ClawAudit verdict
ace-step-music
Local music generation skill installing ACE-Step from GitHub and running locally on Apple Silicon; no data sent to external services and capabilities are for model download and local generation only.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
package_install
Findings (9)
Possible hardcoded credential
SUMMARY.md · code · TOKEN="your_bot_token
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
AGENT_USAGE.md · code · subprocess.run(
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
capsule.json · prose · downgraded · curl -fsSL https://evomap.ai/assets/ace-step-deploy.sh | bash
Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands
capsule.json · prose · downgraded · | bash
Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code
SUMMARY.md · prose · downgraded · | Python
subprocess with shell=True — command injection vector
ace_step_agent_server.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
cmd,
shell=True
POSTs data to external URL
AGENT_USAGE.md · code · .post('http://
References webhook/callback URL
SUMMARY.md · code · WEBHOOK_URL
Python shutil file operation — copies/moves/deletes files
ace-step-deploy.sh · prose · downgraded · shutil.move(
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B/D/F). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
package_installnetwork_in Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.