ClawAudit verdict
openclaw-backup
agent-backup
Backs up agent workspace files with age encryption for secrets; secrets are opt-in and explicitly blocked from unencrypted cloud push, with no evidence of exfiltration to attacker-controlled endpoints.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (6)
Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly
README.md · code · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code
scripts/schedule.sh · prose · downgraded · | python3
References agent memory files
README.md · code · MEMORY.md
Accesses system credential store
references/what-to-backup.md · prose · downgraded · keychain
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
scripts/restore.sh · prose · downgraded · subprocess.check_output(
Python shutil file operation — copies/moves/deletes files
scripts/pre-change-snapshot.sh · prose · downgraded · shutil.rmtree(
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class B/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.