Caveat verdict
agent-cli
The skill executes external commands using tmux and sends keys, which could be risky if not properly sanitized.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (5)
Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands
references/README.md · code · | bash
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
references/README.md · code · curl https://cursor.com/install -fsS | bash
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
references/cursorcli.md · code · subprocess.run(
Accesses shell history/config
references/README.md · code · ~/.zshrc
References agent configuration files
references/cursorcli.md · prose · downgraded · CLAUDE.md
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.