Caveat verdict

agent-life

🟢 Trusted

No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan — automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

The skill explicitly documents what is uploaded (an allowlist of memory/identity/config files), states credentials are encrypted client-side before transmission, and provides dry-run and ignore-file controls; the cloud sync behavior is the stated purpose and is transparently disclosed.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

security

100

transparency

maintenance

Findings (3)

Pattern match high

Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly

SKILL.md · frontmatter · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json

Coarse signal — prose, single-step high

Instruction-prose smuggling shape detected: collects a sensitive target ("API key") and emits it outward ("report"). Phrased as prose with no trigger tokens — a semantic prompt-injection / data-exfil pattern the syntactic scanners can't see. Final tier capped at Caution; review the instructions before installing.

SKILL.md · | Error / Issue Code | Cause | Fix | | --- | --- | --- | | `no_api_key` | No API key configured | `alf login --key <key>` | | `workspace_not_found` | Workspace

Pattern match low

References agent memory files

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · MEMORY.md

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class F). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

Requires 1 environment variable. (1 sensitive: ALF_API_KEY). Requires 1 system binary.

Is this flag fair?

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