Caveat verdict

agent-manager

agent-manager-v1

45
🟠 Risky
Significant risk patterns flagged — automated deep scan, not behavioral proof.

Similar to agent-im-manager-v100, it involves management of agents and potential access to sensitive information.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

10
security
100
transparency
100
maintenance

Permission integrity

Installs packages at runtime — transitive dependencies are not auditable

package_install

Findings (7)

Pattern match high

HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads

CLAWHUB.md · code · http://127.0.0.1

Pattern match high

<script> tag in markdown — potential code injection

server-gemini.js · prose · downgraded · <script>

Pattern match high

Possible hardcoded credential

server.js · prose · downgraded · Token: 'ZZitPPb3LZmDH2c_jYl9Xbub2NO1CrqntpGgF-LBEGM

Pattern match medium

Uses exec() — may execute shell commands

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · exec(

Pattern match medium

References child_process — can spawn system processes

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · child_process

Pattern match low

Popular HTTP library — network access

package-lock.json · prose · downgraded · node-fetch

Pattern match low

References agent configuration files

register-existing.js · prose · downgraded · AGENT_CONFIG

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

package_installnetwork_in

Is this flag fair?

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