Caveat verdict
agent-security-skill-scanner
The skill scans for security issues but also executes code, which could potentially be exploited if not properly handled.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
network_out
package_install
Findings (24)
Uses eval() — can execute arbitrary code
config_detector.py · prose · downgraded · eval(
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
curl_risk_classifier.py · prose · downgraded · curl | bash
Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands
curl_risk_classifier.py · prose · downgraded · | bash
Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands
curl_risk_classifier.py · prose · downgraded · |sh
Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code
curl_risk_classifier.py · prose · downgraded · |python
Bash /dev/tcp — raw TCP connection via shell
curl_risk_classifier.py · prose · downgraded · /dev/tcp/
Accesses sensitive system files
src/engines/__init__.py · prose · downgraded · /etc/shadow
Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command
src/engines/hybrid_scanner_v2.py · prose · downgraded · rm -rf /
Accesses AWS credentials file
whitelist_filter.py · prose · downgraded · ~/.aws/credentials
Uses exec() — may execute shell commands
config_detector.py · prose · downgraded · exec(
Accesses .ssh directory
credential_theft_classifier.py · prose · downgraded · .ssh/
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
src/engines/__init__.py · prose · downgraded · sudo
setuid — privilege escalation mechanism
src/engines/__init__.py · prose · downgraded · setuid
References child_process — can spawn system processes
src/engines/pattern_engine.py · prose · downgraded · child_process
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
whitelist_filter.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.call(
os.system/popen — direct OS command execution
whitelist_filter.py · prose · downgraded · os.system(
Raw socket connection — low-level network access
whitelist_filter.py · prose · downgraded · socket.connect(
Accesses cloud provider credentials
whitelist_filter.py · prose · downgraded · ~/.aws
Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable
scanner.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(
Python urllib.request — network access
src/engines/hybrid_scanner_v2.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request
POSTs data to external URL
src/engines/llm_engine.py · prose · downgraded · .post('https://
Base64 encoding/decoding
src/engines/pattern_engine.py · prose · downgraded · base64_decode
Python shutil file operation — copies/moves/deletes files
whitelist_filter.py · prose · downgraded · shutil.rmtree(
Python os.getenv — reads environment variable
whitelist_filter.py · prose · downgraded · os.getenv(
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/D/E). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
package_installnetwork_out Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.