ClawAudit verdict

context-engineering-collection

agent-skills-context

88
🟢 Trusted
Low risk — reviewed by ClawAudit, behavior matches stated purpose

This skill seems to provide general guidance and information about context engineering for AI agents. It does not appear to use any capabilities in a way that would be considered risky or dangerous.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
90
transparency
70
maintenance

Findings (18)

Pattern match critical

Raw model control tokens — prompt injection via token manipulation

examples/book-sft-pipeline/references/tinker-format.md · code · <|im_start|>

Pattern match critical

Possible hardcoded credential

examples/interleaved-thinking/docs/interleavedthinking.md · code · api_key="<api-key>

Pattern match high

Uses exec() — may execute shell commands

skills/hosted-agents/references/infrastructure-patterns.md · code · exec(

Pattern match high

Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code

examples/digital-brain-skill/SKILLS-MAPPING.md · prose · downgraded · | Python

Pattern match high

Uses eval() — can execute arbitrary code

examples/interleaved-thinking/examples/03_full_optimization.py · prose · downgraded · eval(

Pattern match high

Fake system prompt — attempts to inject instructions

examples/interleaved-thinking/SKILL.md · code · System: You are

Pattern match high

subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python

skills/filesystem-context/references/implementation-patterns.md · code · subprocess.run(

Pattern match high

subprocess with shell=True — command injection vector

skills/filesystem-context/references/implementation-patterns.md · code · subprocess.run( command, shell=True

Pattern match high

os.system/popen — direct OS command execution

skills/hosted-agents/references/infrastructure-patterns.md · code · os.system(

Pattern match medium

Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness

docs/compression.md · prose · downgraded · silently

Pattern match medium

Popular HTTP library — network access

examples/book-sft-pipeline/examples/gertrude-stein/sample_outputs.md · code · got

Pattern match medium

References agent configuration files

examples/llm-as-judge-skills/README.md · code · AgentConfig

Pattern match medium

Python shutil file operation — copies/moves/deletes files

skills/project-development/references/pipeline-patterns.md · code · shutil.rmtree(

Pattern match medium

Opens WebSocket connection

skills/hosted-agents/references/infrastructure-patterns.md · code · WebSocket

Pattern match medium

Python aiohttp session — async network access

skills/hosted-agents/references/infrastructure-patterns.md · code · aiohttp.ClientSession

Pattern match low

Python os.getenv — reads environment variable

examples/interleaved-thinking/examples/01_basic_capture.py · prose · downgraded · os.getenv(

Pattern match low

Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable

examples/interleaved-thinking/reasoning_trace_optimizer/analyzer.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(

Pattern match low

Accesses sensitive environment variables

examples/llm-as-judge-skills/src/config/index.ts · prose · downgraded · process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

Is this flag fair?

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