Caveat verdict

context-engineering-collection

agent-skills-context

88
🟢 Trusted
No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan — automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

This skill seems to provide general guidance and information about context engineering for AI agents. It does not appear to use any capabilities in a way that would be considered risky or dangerous.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
90
transparency
70
maintenance

Findings (18)

Pattern match critical

Raw model control tokens — prompt injection via token manipulation

examples/book-sft-pipeline/references/tinker-format.md · code · <|im_start|>

Pattern match critical

Possible hardcoded credential

examples/interleaved-thinking/docs/interleavedthinking.md · code · api_key="<api-key>

Pattern match high

Uses exec() — may execute shell commands

skills/hosted-agents/references/infrastructure-patterns.md · code · exec(

Pattern match high

Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code

examples/digital-brain-skill/SKILLS-MAPPING.md · prose · downgraded · | Python

Pattern match high

Uses eval() — can execute arbitrary code

examples/interleaved-thinking/examples/03_full_optimization.py · prose · downgraded · eval(

Pattern match high

Fake system prompt — attempts to inject instructions

examples/interleaved-thinking/SKILL.md · code · System: You are

Pattern match high

subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python

skills/filesystem-context/references/implementation-patterns.md · code · subprocess.run(

Pattern match high

subprocess with shell=True — command injection vector

skills/filesystem-context/references/implementation-patterns.md · code · subprocess.run( command, shell=True

Pattern match high

os.system/popen — direct OS command execution

skills/hosted-agents/references/infrastructure-patterns.md · code · os.system(

Pattern match medium

Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness

docs/compression.md · prose · downgraded · silently

Pattern match medium

Popular HTTP library — network access

examples/book-sft-pipeline/examples/gertrude-stein/sample_outputs.md · code · got

Pattern match medium

References agent configuration files

examples/llm-as-judge-skills/README.md · code · AgentConfig

Pattern match medium

Python shutil file operation — copies/moves/deletes files

skills/project-development/references/pipeline-patterns.md · code · shutil.rmtree(

Pattern match medium

Opens WebSocket connection

skills/hosted-agents/references/infrastructure-patterns.md · code · WebSocket

Pattern match medium

Python aiohttp session — async network access

skills/hosted-agents/references/infrastructure-patterns.md · code · aiohttp.ClientSession

Pattern match low

Python os.getenv — reads environment variable

examples/interleaved-thinking/examples/01_basic_capture.py · prose · downgraded · os.getenv(

Pattern match low

Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable

examples/interleaved-thinking/reasoning_trace_optimizer/analyzer.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(

Pattern match low

Accesses sensitive environment variables

examples/llm-as-judge-skills/src/config/index.ts · prose · downgraded · process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

Is this flag fair?

Check another skill Browse the registry Auditing your own skills or configs? Use the API