ClawAudit verdict
agent-skills-setup
This skill provides standardized documentation and workflows for migrating AI-agent configurations between IDEs; it uses bash scripts to copy local config files between known IDE directories, which is entirely consistent with its stated purpose of skill/config migration.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
agent_memory
Findings (9)
Possible hardcoded credential
references/openclaw.md · code · API_KEY: "${GEMINI_API_KEY}
Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly
SKILL.md · code · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
apt-get install — installs system packages
references/openclaw.md · code · apt-get install
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
scripts/auto-configure-openclaw-skills.sh · prose · downgraded · curl -fsSL https://openclaw.ai/install.sh | bash
Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands
scripts/auto-configure-openclaw-skills.sh · prose · downgraded · | bash
Accesses cloud provider credentials
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · ~/.aws
Uses exec() — may execute shell commands
scripts/auto-configure-openclaw-skills.sh · prose · downgraded · exec(
References agent configuration files
references/ide-config-verification.md · prose · downgraded · CLAUDE.md
Accesses sensitive environment variables
scripts/auto-configure-openclaw-skills.sh · prose · downgraded · process.env.API_KEY
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B/F). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
agent_memory Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.