Caveat verdict

agent-browser

agentic-browser

88
🟢 Trusted
No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan — automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

Browser automation skill via the inference.sh platform that installs a CLI tool (with SHA-256 checksum verification explicitly mentioned), opens web pages, and interacts with elements — all browser actions are directed by the user and sent to the documented inference.sh service; the executionSinkDetected flag reflects the curl-piped install which the content itself transparently describes and mitigates.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

5
security
70
transparency
70
maintenance

Permission integrity

Makes network requests but does not declare curl/wget in required binaries

network_out

Findings (3)

Pattern match critical

Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector

SKILL.md · code · curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh

Pattern match critical

Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands

SKILL.md · code · | sh

Pattern match high

Possible hardcoded credential

templates/authenticated-session.sh · prose · downgraded · PASSWORD='your-password

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

network_out

Is this flag fair?

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