ClawAudit verdict

agentpulse

agentpulse-monitor

45
🟠 Risky
Significant concerns — only install if you understand the risks

The one-liner install pattern `curl -fsSL https://agentpulse.io/install.sh | bash` executes remotely fetched code directly on the host; while common for monitoring tools, it constitutes downloading and running unvetted scripts from the internet.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

10
security
60
transparency
80
maintenance

Permission integrity

Makes network requests but does not declare curl/wget in required binaries

network_out

Findings (5)

Pattern match critical

Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector

SKILL.md · code · curl -fsSL https://agentpulse.io/install.sh | bash

Pattern match critical

Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands

SKILL.md · code · | bash

Pattern match medium

subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python

src/agent_client.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(

Pattern match low

Python urllib.request — network access

src/agent_client.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request

Pattern match low

Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable

src/agent_client.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

network_outnetwork_incredential_access

Is this flag fair?

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