ClawAudit verdict
alibabacloud-lindorm-vector-migrate-skill
Vector database migration assistant that collects user parameters and generates/executes migration code — file_read capability is used legitimately to read CSV export files, and all operations are transparently scoped to the stated Lindorm migration workflow.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
file_read
Findings (6)
Possible hardcoded credential
references/01-dev/milvus-migrate.md · code · token="<api_key>
Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code
references/02-ops/ttl-config.md · code · | python3
Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness
references/01-dev/milvus-migrate.md · code · silently
Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable
references/01-dev/csv-import.md · code · os.environ.get(
Dynamic import() — loads module at runtime
references/03-ref/csv-format.md · prose · downgraded · import (`
Python urllib.request — network access
references/03-ref/bulk-write.md · prose · downgraded · urllib.request
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class B). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
file_read Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.