Caveat verdict
alibabacloud-oss-media-process
The skill uses Aliyun CLI for media processing, and the capabilities used are legitimate and transparent.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (10)
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · curl -fsSL https://aliyuncli.alicdn.com/setup.sh | bash
Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · | bash
Accesses shell history/config
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · ~/.zshrc
Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness
scripts/credential.py · prose · downgraded · silently
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
scripts/process.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
Base64 encoding/decoding
references/audio-operations.md · prose · downgraded · Base64-encode
Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable
scripts/check_permissions.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(
Python urllib.request — network access
scripts/process.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request
Popular HTTP library — network access
scripts/process.py · prose · downgraded · got
importlib.import_module — dynamic module loading
scripts/process.py · prose · downgraded · importlib.import_module(
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.