ClawAudit verdict
alibabacloud-pds-multimodal-search
PDS file search (filename, semantic, image-based) via aliyun CLI with explicit rules not to silently broaden the search scope; behavior matches the stated multimodal search purpose.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
network_out
package_install
Findings (6)
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
SKILL.md · code · curl -fsSL --max-time 10 https://aliyuncli.alicdn.com/install.sh | bash
Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands
SKILL.md · code · | bash
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
references/cli-installation-guide.md · code · sudo
pip3 install — installs Python packages at runtime
SKILL.md · code · pip3 install
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
scripts/pds_poll_processor.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
Base64 encoding/decoding
scripts/render_visual_similar_search_process.py · prose · downgraded · base64_encode
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
network_outpackage_install Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.