Caveat verdict
alibabacloud-vms-smart-call-by-tts
The skill provides transparent and legitimate use of Alibaba Cloud VMS for AI-powered voice calls, with clear architecture and instructions.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (9)
Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command
references/plugin-troubleshooting.md · code · rm -rf ~
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
scripts/install_aliyun_cli.sh · prose · downgraded · curl | bash
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
references/cli-installation-guide.md · code · sudo
Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands
scripts/install_aliyun_cli.sh · prose · downgraded · | bash
Accesses shell history/config
references/cli-installation-guide.md · code · ~/.zshrc
Changes file ownership
references/plugin-troubleshooting.md · code · chown
Social engineering — falsely claims user authorization
skill-card.md · prose · downgraded · the user has configured
Python urllib.request — network access
scripts/dyvmsapi_rpc.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request
Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable
scripts/dyvmsapi_rpc.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B/C/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.