ClawAudit verdict

aliyun-domain

88
🟢 Trusted
Low risk — reviewed by ClawAudit, behavior matches stated purpose

Domain asset management via Alibaba Cloud OpenAPI with RAG retrieval from a local knowledge base; broad capabilities (file_write, network_out) are used legitimately for domain monitoring scripts and API calls.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
40
transparency
70
maintenance

Permission integrity

Makes network requests but does not declare curl/wget in required binaries

network_out

Performs file operations but does not declare file-accessing binaries

file_read+write

Installs packages at runtime — transitive dependencies are not auditable

package_install

Findings (9)

Pattern match critical

Possible hardcoded credential

SKILL.md · code · SECRET="your-access-key-secret

Pattern match high

Accesses shell history/config

SKILL.md · code · ~/.zshrc

Pattern match medium

pip3 install — installs Python packages at runtime

SKILL.md · code · pip3 install

Pattern match medium

subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python

scripts/domain_monitor.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(

Pattern match medium

References sudo — requests elevated privileges

scripts/README_DOMAIN_MONITOR.md · prose · downgraded · sudo

Pattern match medium

apt-get install — installs system packages

scripts/README_DOMAIN_MONITOR.md · prose · downgraded · apt-get install

Pattern match medium

yum install — installs system packages

scripts/README_DOMAIN_MONITOR.md · prose · downgraded · yum install

Pattern match medium

References webhook/callback URL

scripts/README_DOMAIN_MONITOR.md · code · webhook_url

Pattern match low

Python os.getenv — reads environment variable

scripts/aliyun_domain.py · prose · downgraded · os.getenv(

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D/F). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

file_writepackage_installnetwork_innetwork_out

Is this flag fair?

Check another skill Browse the registry Auditing your own skills or configs? Use the API