Caveat verdict
antigravity-rotator
Manages the user's own Google Antigravity accounts for quota rotation using credentials the user provides; the dashboard, token refresh, and rotation logic all operate on the user's own accounts via local OpenClaw APIs.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
file_read+write
Findings (5)
<script> tag in markdown — potential code injection
scripts/dashboard.js · prose · downgraded · <script>
References child_process — can spawn system processes
index.js · prose · downgraded · child_process
HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads
scripts/dashboard.js · prose · downgraded · http://0.0.0.0
Uses exec() — may execute shell commands
scripts/dashboard.js · prose · downgraded · exec(
Node http/https module — low-level network access
scripts/dashboard.js · prose · downgraded · require('http')
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
file_write Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.