ClawAudit verdict
install-openclaw
auto-install-openclaw
Accesses credentials AND makes external network calls
The skill uses `curl -fsSL https://openclaw.ai/install.sh | bash` (classic pipe-to-bash pattern) and hardcodes a specific third-party Claude API relay URL (https://ai.jiexi6.cn) into the user's configuration — combining a remote code execution install pattern with routing API keys through an unvetted intermediary.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
What it does
These are capability combinations: each listed behavior occurs in the skill, but ClawAudit detects co-occurrence — it does not verify that one flows into another. Read the code to confirm a live chain.
Accesses credentials AND makes external network calls — potential credential theft
LLM02 · ASI03
Permission integrity
network_out
credential_access
package_install
Findings (4)
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
SKILL.md · code · curl -fsSL https://openclaw.ai/install.sh | bash
Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands
SKILL.md · code · | bash
Possible hardcoded credential
scripts/install-feishu.sh · prose · downgraded · Secret: " APP_SECRET
echo
References agent memory files
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · MEMORY.md
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
network_outcredential_accesspackage_install Thanks — recorded.