ClawAudit verdict
baoyu-post-to-wechat
baoyu-post-to-wechat-2
WeChat Official Account publishing skill using browser CDP or API; posts user-provided content to WeChat matching the stated purpose with no unexpected data destinations.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (13)
Possible hardcoded credential
scripts/wechat-article.ts · prose · downgraded · token='));
const wechatTab = loggedInTab || allTargets.targetInfos.find(t
References child_process — can spawn system processes
scripts/cdp.ts · prose · downgraded · child_process
Uses spawn() — can execute external programs
scripts/copy-to-clipboard.ts · prose · downgraded · spawn(
HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads
scripts/vendor/baoyu-chrome-cdp/src/index.ts · prose · downgraded · http://127.0.0.1
Raw socket connection — low-level network access
scripts/vendor/baoyu-chrome-cdp/src/index.ts · prose · downgraded · socket.connect(
Uses exec() — may execute shell commands
scripts/vendor/baoyu-md/src/extensions/alert.ts · prose · downgraded · exec(
Dynamic import() — loads module at runtime
scripts/vendor/baoyu-md/src/extensions/infographic.ts · prose · downgraded · import('
References agent configuration files
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · CLAUDE.md
Opens WebSocket connection
scripts/vendor/baoyu-chrome-cdp/src/index.ts · prose · downgraded · WebSocket
String.fromCharCode — can build strings to evade detection
scripts/vendor/baoyu-md/src/extensions/plantuml.ts · prose · downgraded · String.fromCharCode
Base64 encode (btoa) — may obfuscate data exfiltration
scripts/vendor/baoyu-md/src/extensions/plantuml.ts · prose · downgraded · btoa(
Popular HTTP library — network access
scripts/wechat-article.ts · prose · downgraded · got
Accesses sensitive environment variables
scripts/wechat-extend-config.ts · prose · downgraded · process.env.WECHAT_APP_SECRET
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class B/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.