ClawAudit verdict
bee-push-email
bee-push-email-skill
The skill explicitly reads the Telegram bot token from the agent config file and pipes a binary install via curl to tar into /usr/local/bin — both individually raise concern, though the skill documents these steps transparently as part of a legitimate IMAP monitoring installation.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (9)
Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code
SKILL.md · code · | python3
Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness
CHANGELOG.md · prose · downgraded · silently
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
scripts/setup.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
Sets world-executable permissions
scripts/setup.py · prose · downgraded · chmod 700
Changes file ownership
scripts/setup.py · prose · downgraded · chown
Python shutil file operation — copies/moves/deletes files
scripts/setup.py · prose · downgraded · shutil.rmtree(
Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable
scripts/setup.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(
Python urllib.request — network access
scripts/telegram_commands.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.