Caveat verdict

bilibili-video-transcriber

88
🟢 Trusted
No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan — automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

B-station transcription with multi-path cookie storage and optional Feishu QR notification; capabilities match stated local transcription purpose.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

5
security
90
transparency
80
maintenance

Permission integrity

Installs packages at runtime — transitive dependencies are not auditable

package_install

Findings (10)

Pattern match high

HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads

examples/README.md · code · http://127.0.0.1

Pattern match high

Possible hardcoded credential

config.yaml · prose · downgraded · password: "password

Pattern match medium

Long base64 string (100+ chars) — likely obfuscated payload

bilibili_cookies.json · prose · downgraded · sUZMwk7vuNrOW3USVnNfUFlmWGNKWHlRMDR1NHJnTWVoNzdRWVlRYTU5NDRqbHJkaXZvNzlITS1iN3VR

Pattern match medium

subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python

bilibili_transcriber.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(

Pattern match medium

References sudo — requests elevated privileges

setup.py · prose · downgraded · sudo

Pattern match medium

Accesses shell history/config

setup.py · prose · downgraded · ~/.zshrc

Pattern match low

Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable

bilibili_transcriber.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(

Pattern match low

POSTs data to external URL

cookie_manager.py · prose · downgraded · .post( "https://

Pattern match low

Python shutil file operation — copies/moves/deletes files

make_package.py · prose · downgraded · shutil.copytree(

Pattern match low

Python urllib.request — network access

smart_subtitle_downloader.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

package_install

Is this flag fair?

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