ClawAudit verdict
bittensor-sn85-vibe-miner
Receives external input AND executes processes
The setup instructions use `curl -fsSL ... | /bin/bash` for dependency installation and direct `scp` transfer of Bittensor wallet keys to a remote GPU host, creating a meaningful risk that a compromised installer or misconfigured host could capture private keys.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
What it does
These are capability combinations: each listed behavior occurs in the skill, but ClawAudit detects co-occurrence — it does not verify that one flows into another. Read the code to confirm a live chain.
Receives external input AND executes processes — the shape of a command & control channel
LLM05 · LLM06 · ASI10
Executes processes AND makes external network calls — may exfiltrate command output
LLM02 · LLM06 · ASI03
Installs packages AND executes processes — opaque dependency chain with execution
LLM03 · ASI04
Permission integrity
network_out
package_install
Findings (3)
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
SKILL.md · code · sudo
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
SKILL.md · code · subprocess.run(
Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · silently
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
network_outpackage_installnetwork_inprocess_exec Thanks — recorded.