ClawAudit verdict
call-aida-app
Invokes an internal AI service with user-provided appid and parameters; scope is clearly limited to internal corporate LLM calls.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (6)
Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code
EXAMPLES.md · code · | python3
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
00-START-HERE.md · code · subprocess.run(
References agent configuration files
EXAMPLES.md · code · agent-config
Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly
README.zh.md · prose · downgraded · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
Python urllib.request — network access
call_aida_app.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request
Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable
call_aida_app.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class B/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.