ClawAudit verdict

camofox-browser

88
🟢 Trusted
Low risk — reviewed by ClawAudit, behavior matches stated purpose

A locally-run headless browser automation server for AI agents; network_in reflects accepting local connections and package_install is for the npm setup, both consistent with the stated browser automation purpose.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
60
transparency
80
maintenance

Permission integrity

Installs packages at runtime — transitive dependencies are not auditable

package_install

Findings (7)

Pattern match critical

Possible hardcoded credential

README.md · code · API_KEY="your-generated-key

Pattern match high

<script> tag in markdown — potential code injection

tests/helpers/testSite.js · prose · downgraded · <script>

Pattern match high

Accesses sensitive system files

tests/unit/security.test.js · prose · downgraded · /etc/passwd

Pattern match medium

References child_process — can spawn system processes

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · child_process

Pattern match medium

Dynamic import() — loads module at runtime

lib/launcher.js · prose · downgraded · import('

Pattern match low

Accesses sensitive environment variables

lib/config.js · prose · downgraded · process.env.FLY_API_TOKEN

Pattern match low

Base64 encoding/decoding

tests/e2e/screenshot.test.js · prose · downgraded · base64-encode

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class B). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

network_inpackage_install

Is this flag fair?

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