Caveat verdict

chrome-cdp-controller

88
🟢 Trusted
No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan — automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

Browser automation via Puppeteer/CDP connecting to a locally running Chrome instance on localhost; network_out and package_install capabilities are used legitimately for the documented browser automation purpose.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

38
security
70
transparency
80
maintenance

Permission integrity

Makes network requests but does not declare curl/wget in required binaries

network_out

Installs packages at runtime — transitive dependencies are not auditable

package_install

Findings (3)

Pattern match high

Accesses shell history/config

references/chrome-setup.md · code · ~/.zshrc

Pattern match high

Uses eval() — can execute arbitrary code

scripts/cdp_controller.js · prose · downgraded · eval(

Pattern match low

Opens WebSocket connection

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · WebSocket

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class B). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

network_outpackage_install

Is this flag fair?

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