ClawAudit verdict
chrome-for-openclaw
Fetches from network AND uses eval/Function
Setup requires running `bash <(curl -fsSL ...)` from GitHub with sudo to install XRDP and Chrome, and the resulting automation can access existing logged-in browser sessions (Gmail, GitHub, etc.); while the GitHub repo is named and the purpose is documented, the combination of remote script execution with sudo and live session access warrants scrutiny.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
What it does
These are capability combinations: each listed behavior occurs in the skill, but ClawAudit detects co-occurrence — it does not verify that one flows into another. Read the code to confirm a live chain.
Fetches from network AND uses eval/Function — the remote-code-execution pattern (data-flow not verified)
LLM05 · LLM06 · ASI05
Permission integrity
network_out
package_install
Findings (5)
HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads
SKILL.md · code · http://127.0.0.1
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
SKILL.md · code · sudo
Accesses shell history/config
references/authentication.md · code · ~/.profile
Opens WebSocket connection
SKILL.md · code · WebSocket
Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness
references/snapshot-refs.md · prose · downgraded · silently
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class B). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
network_outpackage_installdynamic_eval Thanks — recorded.