ClawAudit verdict
claw-insights-install
The recommended install method is `curl -fsSL https://claw-insights.com/install.sh | sh`, which executes remotely-fetched code without verification — a pattern that can be exploited if the server is compromised, even though the stated purpose (local observability dashboard) is legitimate.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
network_out
package_install
Findings (5)
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
SKILL.md · code · curl -fsSL https://claw-insights.com/install.sh | sh
Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands
SKILL.md · code · | sh
Possible hardcoded credential
references/troubleshooting.md · code · TOKEN="${CLAW_INSIGHTS_API_TOKEN:-$(cat ~/.claw-insights/auth-secret 2>/dev/null
HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads
SKILL.md · code · http://127.0.0.1
Downloads executables from external URLs
references/troubleshooting.md · prose · downgraded · download from https://
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
network_outpackage_install Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.