Caveat verdict

clawchat-p2p

88
🟢 Trusted
No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan — automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

Encrypted P2P messaging daemon connecting OpenClaw agents; uses end-to-end encryption with no central server, network operations match declared messaging purpose.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

13
security
60
transparency
80
maintenance

Permission integrity

Installs packages at runtime — transitive dependencies are not auditable

package_install

Findings (7)

Pattern match high

Possible hardcoded credential

skills/clawchat/scripts/example-multi-agent-setup.sh · prose · downgraded · password="example-${name}-password

Pattern match high

References sudo — requests elevated privileges

skills/clawchat/SKILL.md · code · sudo

Pattern match medium

Popular HTTP library — network access

REFERENCE.md · code · Got

Pattern match medium

Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness

skills/clawchat/RECIPES.md · prose · downgraded · Silently

Pattern match medium

Dynamic import() — loads module at runtime

src/cli.ts · prose · downgraded · import('

Pattern match medium

References child_process — can spawn system processes

src/daemon/server.ts · prose · downgraded · child_process

Pattern match low

Opens WebSocket connection

README.md · prose · downgraded · WebSocket

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class B/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

package_install

Is this flag fair?

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