ClawAudit verdict

clawned

88
🟢 Trusted
Low risk — reviewed by ClawAudit, behavior matches stated purpose

Security agent that scans installed skills and syncs only metadata to clawned.io; explicitly states .env files are excluded and only skill metadata is sent during sync.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
80
transparency
70
maintenance

Findings (22)

Pattern match high

Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands

references/detection-patterns.md · prose · downgraded · |sh

Pattern match high

Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code

references/detection-patterns.md · prose · downgraded · |python

Pattern match high

Bash /dev/tcp — raw TCP connection via shell

references/threat-model.md · prose · downgraded · /dev/tcp/

Pattern match high

Uses eval() — can execute arbitrary code

references/threat-model.md · prose · downgraded · eval(

Pattern match high

Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands

references/threat-model.md · prose · downgraded · |bash

Pattern match high

Accesses sensitive system files

references/threat-model.md · prose · downgraded · /etc/passwd

Pattern match medium

Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json

Pattern match medium

References child_process — can spawn system processes

references/detection-patterns.md · prose · downgraded · child_process

Pattern match medium

Accesses .ssh directory

references/detection-patterns.md · prose · downgraded · .ssh/

Pattern match medium

Accesses system credential store

references/detection-patterns.md · prose · downgraded · keychain

Pattern match medium

Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness

references/threat-model.md · prose · downgraded · silently

Pattern match medium

References sudo — requests elevated privileges

references/detection-patterns.md · prose · downgraded · sudo

Pattern match medium

Bash hex escape string — obfuscated command

references/detection-patterns.md · prose · downgraded · $'\x63\x75\x72\x6c'

Pattern match medium

Uses exec() — may execute shell commands

references/threat-model.md · prose · downgraded · exec(

Pattern match medium

subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python

references/threat-model.md · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(

Pattern match medium

Raw socket connection — low-level network access

references/threat-model.md · prose · downgraded · socket.connect(

Pattern match medium

Accesses cloud provider credentials

references/threat-model.md · prose · downgraded · ~/.aws

Pattern match low

Uses XMLHttpRequest — network access

references/detection-patterns.md · prose · downgraded · XMLHttpRequest

Pattern match low

Popular HTTP library — network access

references/detection-patterns.md · prose · downgraded · axios

Pattern match low

Sets world-executable permissions

references/threat-model.md · prose · downgraded · chmod 4755

Pattern match low

Python urllib.request — network access

scripts/agent.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request

Pattern match low

Python os.getenv — reads environment variable

scripts/agent.py · prose · downgraded · os.getenv(

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/D/F). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

network_in

Is this flag fair?

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