ClawAudit verdict
clawned
Security agent that scans installed skills and syncs only metadata to clawned.io; explicitly states .env files are excluded and only skill metadata is sent during sync.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (22)
Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands
references/detection-patterns.md · prose · downgraded · |sh
Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code
references/detection-patterns.md · prose · downgraded · |python
Bash /dev/tcp — raw TCP connection via shell
references/threat-model.md · prose · downgraded · /dev/tcp/
Uses eval() — can execute arbitrary code
references/threat-model.md · prose · downgraded · eval(
Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands
references/threat-model.md · prose · downgraded · |bash
Accesses sensitive system files
references/threat-model.md · prose · downgraded · /etc/passwd
Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
References child_process — can spawn system processes
references/detection-patterns.md · prose · downgraded · child_process
Accesses .ssh directory
references/detection-patterns.md · prose · downgraded · .ssh/
Accesses system credential store
references/detection-patterns.md · prose · downgraded · keychain
Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness
references/threat-model.md · prose · downgraded · silently
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
references/detection-patterns.md · prose · downgraded · sudo
Bash hex escape string — obfuscated command
references/detection-patterns.md · prose · downgraded · $'\x63\x75\x72\x6c'
Uses exec() — may execute shell commands
references/threat-model.md · prose · downgraded · exec(
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
references/threat-model.md · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
Raw socket connection — low-level network access
references/threat-model.md · prose · downgraded · socket.connect(
Accesses cloud provider credentials
references/threat-model.md · prose · downgraded · ~/.aws
Uses XMLHttpRequest — network access
references/detection-patterns.md · prose · downgraded · XMLHttpRequest
Popular HTTP library — network access
references/detection-patterns.md · prose · downgraded · axios
Sets world-executable permissions
references/threat-model.md · prose · downgraded · chmod 4755
Python urllib.request — network access
scripts/agent.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request
Python os.getenv — reads environment variable
scripts/agent.py · prose · downgraded · os.getenv(
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/D/F). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
network_in Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.