ClawAudit verdict

clawpurse

🟠 Risky

Significant concerns — only install if you understand the risks

This skill enables agentic autonomous transfer of NTMPI tokens on the Neutaro blockchain including a --yes flag to bypass confirmation above 100 NTMPI, and requires managing a wallet password/mnemonic, constituting real financial transaction capability.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

security

transparency

maintenance

Permission integrity

Installs packages at runtime — transitive dependencies are not auditable

package_install

Findings (6)

Pattern match critical

Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command

docs/OPERATOR-GUIDE.md · code · rm -rf ~

Pattern match high

Possible hardcoded credential

src/cli.ts · prose · downgraded · password: '); const { wallet, address } = await loadKeystore(password, keystor

Confirmed in code medium

Accesses process.env — reads environment variables

SKILL.md · code

Pattern match medium

Accesses sensitive environment variables

SKILL.md · code · process.env.CLAWPURSE_PASSWORD

Pattern match medium

Dynamic import() — loads module at runtime

src/cli.ts · prose · downgraded · import('

Pattern match low

Popular HTTP library — network access

src/security.ts · prose · downgraded · got

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class B). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

package_installcredential_access

Is this flag fair?

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