ClawAudit verdict
clickhouse
clickhouse-developer
Receives external input AND uses eval
The skill is a comprehensive developer reference guide for ClickHouse database design and operations; the dynamic_eval capability reflects inline Python/SQL examples for documentation purposes, not live eval of remote or untrusted input.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
What it does
These are capability combinations: each listed behavior occurs in the skill, but ClawAudit detects co-occurrence — it does not verify that one flows into another. Read the code to confirm a live chain.
Receives external input AND uses eval — the remote code-injection pattern (data-flow not verified)
LLM01 · LLM05 · ASI01 · ASI05
Reads files AND uses eval/Function — may execute locally stored payloads
LLM05 · LLM06 · ASI05
Permission integrity
file_read
package_install
Findings (5)
Possible hardcoded credential
SKILL.md · code · password=",
)
if err != nil { log.Fatal(err) }
if err := m.Up(); err != nil && e
Dynamic import() — loads module at runtime
SKILL.md · code · import (
"
Accesses process.env — reads environment variables
SKILL.md · code
Accesses sensitive environment variables
SKILL.md · code · process.env.CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD
Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable
SKILL.md · code · os.environ.get(
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class B). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
dynamic_evalpackage_installnetwork_incredential_accessfile_read Thanks — recorded.