ClawAudit verdict
cliproxy-media
Receives external input AND executes processes
The skill instructs the agent to NEVER use built-in image/pdf tools and instead send all media through a user-configured CLIProxy endpoint, meaning files are routed to a third-party host whose trustworthiness depends entirely on the user's CLIPROXY_URL setting; this is unusual redirection of file handling capability.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
What it does
These are capability combinations: each listed behavior occurs in the skill, but ClawAudit detects co-occurrence — it does not verify that one flows into another. Read the code to confirm a live chain.
Receives external input AND executes processes — the shape of a command & control channel
LLM05 · LLM06 · ASI10
Findings (5)
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
SKILL.md · code · subprocess.run(
Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness
scripts/analyze.py · prose · downgraded · silently
Base64 encoding/decoding
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · Base64-encode
Python urllib.request — network access
scripts/analyze.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request
Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable
scripts/analyze.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
network_inprocess_exec Thanks — recorded.