Caveat verdict

code-reviewer

88
🟢 Trusted
No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan — automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

Comprehensive code review tool combining automated static analysis scripts with AI context reasoning; executionSinkDetected reflects documented local script invocations for its analysis workflow.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
90
transparency
70
maintenance

Findings (11)

Pattern match critical

Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code

SKILL.md · code · | python

Pattern match critical

Possible hardcoded credential

references/severity-guide.md · code · PASSWORD = "prod_db_p@ssw0rd_2024

Pattern match high

Uses eval() — can execute arbitrary code

references/security-rules.md · prose · downgraded · eval(

Pattern match high

Dynamic Function constructor — equivalent to eval()

references/security-rules.md · prose · downgraded · new Function(

Pattern match high

References child_process — can spawn system processes

references/security-rules.md · code · child_process

Pattern match high

Uses exec() — may execute shell commands

references/severity-guide.md · code · exec(

Pattern match high

<script> tag in markdown — potential code injection

scripts/generate_report.py · prose · downgraded · <script>

Pattern match medium

subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python

references/security-rules.md · prose · downgraded · subprocess.call(

Pattern match medium

Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness

references/checklist.md · prose · downgraded · silently

Pattern match medium

os.system/popen — direct OS command execution

references/security-rules.md · prose · downgraded · os.system(

Pattern match medium

subprocess with shell=True — command injection vector

references/security-rules.md · prose · downgraded · subprocess.call(shell=True

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

Is this flag fair?

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