ClawAudit verdict
codeflow
Session streaming skill that relays coding agent output to user-configured Discord or Telegram channels for transparent, observable development sessions.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (16)
Possible hardcoded credential
references/setup.md · code · TOKEN="<BOT_TOKEN>
Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands
extensions/codeflow-enforcer/index.js · prose · downgraded · |sh
Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly
references/setup.md · code · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code
scripts/_internal/bin/dev-relay.sh · prose · downgraded · | python3
Python urllib.request — network access
references/setup.md · code · urllib.request
Accesses system credential store
references/setup.md · prose · downgraded · Keychain
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
scripts/_internal/py/codeflow_skill_flow.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness
scripts/_internal/py/discord-bridge.py · prose · downgraded · silently
HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads
scripts/_internal/py/openclaw_gateway.py · prose · downgraded · http://127.0.0.1
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
scripts/_internal/py/parse-stream.py · prose · downgraded · sudo
Opens WebSocket connection
references/advanced-modes.md · prose · downgraded · websocket
References webhook/callback URL
scripts/_internal/bin/dev-relay.sh · prose · downgraded · WEBHOOK_URL
Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable
scripts/_internal/bin/dev-relay.sh · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(
Python shutil file operation — copies/moves/deletes files
scripts/_internal/bin/dev-relay.sh · prose · downgraded · shutil.rmtree(
Sets world-executable permissions
scripts/_internal/bin/dev-relay.sh · prose · downgraded · chmod 700
Popular HTTP library — network access
scripts/_internal/py/py_compat.py · prose · downgraded · got
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.