ClawAudit verdict
cogniexec
Cognitive execution framework that combines LLM reasoning with code generation and tool invocation; it explicitly requires user confirmation for high-risk operations and the skill describes an orchestration architecture rather than performing any exfiltration.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
package_install
Findings (12)
Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · | Python
Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · rm -rf /
<script> tag in markdown — potential code injection
scripts/code_tools.py · prose · downgraded · <script
Uses eval() — can execute arbitrary code
scripts/data_processor.py · prose · downgraded · eval(
Possible hardcoded credential
scripts/tui_tool.py · prose · downgraded · Password:')
confirm = bool(args.get(
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · sudo
Base64 encoding/decoding
references/command_reference.md · code · base64-encode
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
scripts/code_tools.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
importlib.import_module — dynamic module loading
scripts/code_tools.py · prose · downgraded · importlib.import_module(
Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable
scripts/email_sender.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(
Python shutil file operation — copies/moves/deletes files
scripts/file_manager.py · prose · downgraded · shutil.move(
Python urllib.request — network access
scripts/http_client.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
package_install Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.