Caveat verdict
colipu-procurement
B2B procurement assistant that explicitly requires user confirmation before placing orders and mandates credentials not be stored in code; real-money purchases are gated behind explicit user approval.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (3)
Possible hardcoded credential
CONFIG.md · code · PASSWORD="your_password
os.system/popen — direct OS command execution
scripts/buy_products.py · prose · downgraded · os.system(
Python os.getenv — reads environment variable
scripts/colipu_client.py · prose · downgraded · os.getenv(
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
credential_access Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.