Caveat verdict

coolskill-builder

88
🟢 Trusted
No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan — automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

Accesses credentials AND makes external network calls

Skill-generation meta-tool that applies a 5-layer security scan including explicit checks for eval/exec/os.system; content describes a hardening workflow, not malicious behavior.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
30
transparency
70
maintenance

What it does

These are capability combinations: each listed behavior occurs in the skill, but Caveat detects co-occurrence — it does not verify that one flows into another. Read the code to confirm a live chain.

Capability combination high

Accesses credentials AND makes external network calls — potential credential theft

LLM02 · ASI03

Capability combination high

Accesses credentials AND encodes data — may obfuscate stolen credentials

LLM02 · ASI03 · ASI04

Permission integrity

Makes network requests but does not declare curl/wget in required binaries

network_out

Code accesses API keys/tokens but declares no environment variables

credential_access

Findings (7)

Pattern match high

Uses eval() — can execute arbitrary code

references/security-rules.md · prose · downgraded · eval(

Pattern match high

Python getattr on builtins — dynamic access to dangerous functions

references/security-rules.md · prose · downgraded · getattr(__builtins__

Pattern match high

Accesses sensitive system files

references/security-rules.md · prose · downgraded · /etc/passwd

Pattern match medium

Uses exec() — may execute shell commands

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · exec(

Pattern match medium

Python urllib.request — network access

SKILL.md · code · urllib.request

Pattern match medium

Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable

SKILL.md · code · os.environ.get(

Pattern match medium

os.system/popen — direct OS command execution

references/security-rules.md · prose · downgraded · os.system(

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

network_outcredential_accessdata_encoding
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