ClawAudit verdict

ctct-security-patrol

45
🟠 Risky
Significant concerns — only install if you understand the risks

Even in default local mode the skill reads MAC address, hostname, and full skill inventory; the optional push mode uploads these to auth.ctct.cn creating a persistent device fingerprint via agent_id, so reading sensitive system data by default warrants elevated scrutiny.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

28
security
70
transparency
70
maintenance

Findings (6)

Pattern match high

References sudo — requests elevated privileges

SKILL.md · frontmatter · sudo

Pattern match high

Accesses sensitive system files

scripts/openclaw-hybrid-audit-changeway.js · prose · downgraded · /etc/passwd

Pattern match medium

References child_process — can spawn system processes

scripts/openclaw-hybrid-audit-changeway.js · prose · downgraded · child_process

Pattern match medium

Accesses .ssh directory

scripts/openclaw-hybrid-audit-changeway.js · prose · downgraded · .ssh/

Pattern match medium

Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness

scripts/openclaw-hybrid-audit-changeway.js · prose · downgraded · Silently

Pattern match low

Node http/https module — low-level network access

scripts/openclaw-hybrid-audit-changeway.js · prose · downgraded · require('http')

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

Is this flag fair?

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