Caveat verdict
cursor-agent
cursor-ide-agent
Skill documents two legitimate paths (CLI and VS Code Node) for using Cursor Agent for coding tasks; the curl install command fetches from the official cursor.com domain, network_out is expected for IDE integration, and no exfiltration or deceptive behavior is present.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
network_out
Findings (3)
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
SKILL.md · code · curl https://cursor.com/install -fsS | bash
Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands
SKILL.md · code · | bash
References agent configuration files
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · CLAUDE.md
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
network_out Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.