ClawAudit verdict

dcl-skill-auditor

88
🟢 Trusted
Low risk — reviewed by ClawAudit, behavior matches stated purpose

Accesses credentials AND makes external network calls

An instruction-only static security auditor running entirely within the agent context; injection-pattern strings in the content are part of the detection checklist, not active instructions.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
30
transparency
70
maintenance

What it does

These are capability combinations: each listed behavior occurs in the skill, but ClawAudit detects co-occurrence — it does not verify that one flows into another. Read the code to confirm a live chain.

Capability combination high

Accesses credentials AND makes external network calls — potential credential theft

LLM02 · ASI03

Permission integrity

Makes network requests but does not declare curl/wget in required binaries

network_out

Code accesses API keys/tokens but declares no environment variables

credential_access

Findings (11)

Pattern match high

Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · curl | bash

Pattern match high

Pipe-to-shell pattern (wget | sh)

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · wget | sh

Pattern match high

Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · | bash

Pattern match high

Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · | sh

Pattern match high

Accesses AWS credentials file

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · ~/.aws/credentials

Pattern match high

Uses eval() — can execute arbitrary code

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · eval(

Pattern match medium

Accesses .ssh directory

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · .ssh/

Pattern match medium

Accesses cloud provider credentials

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · ~/.aws

Pattern match medium

Uses exec() — may execute shell commands

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · exec(

Pattern match medium

Base64 decode (atob) — may hide malicious payloads

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · atob(

Pattern match low

Base64 encoding/decoding

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · base64-encode

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

network_outcredential_access
Check another skill Browse the registry Auditing your own skills or configs? Use the API