ClawAudit verdict
ezviz-open-ptz-control
Reads local files AND makes external network calls
Controls the user's own Ezviz PTZ cameras via official Ezviz APIs using user-provided credentials; all operations are transparent and limited to the user's own device control.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
What it does
These are capability combinations: each listed behavior occurs in the skill, but ClawAudit detects co-occurrence — it does not verify that one flows into another. Read the code to confirm a live chain.
Reads local files AND makes external network calls — the capabilities for data exfiltration co-occur (data-flow not verified)
LLM02 · LLM06 · ASI03
Accesses credentials AND writes files — may persist stolen credentials locally
LLM02 · LLM06 · ASI03
Both reads and writes files — verify scope is limited to intended directories
LLM06 · ASI02
Permission integrity
network_out
file_read+write
package_install
Findings (5)
Possible hardcoded credential
SKILL.md · code · SECRET="your_dedicated_app_secret
Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command
SKILL.md · code · rm -rf /
Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code
SKILL.md · code · | python3
Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable
lib/token_manager.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(
Python os.getenv — reads environment variable
scripts/main.py · prose · downgraded · os.getenv(
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class F). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
Requires 2 environment variables. (1 sensitive: EZVIZ_APP_SECRET).
network_outpackage_installcredential_accessfile_writefile_read Thanks — recorded.