ClawAudit verdict
feishu-bot-config-helper
The skill documents an installation step that pipes a remote script directly to bash (curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/jiebao360/feishu-bot-config-helper/main/install.sh | bash), executing untrusted remote code without verification while the skill also auto-configures bots and restarts gateways.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Permission integrity
network_out
Findings (6)
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
SKILL.md · code · curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/jiebao360/feishu-bot-config-helper/
Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands
SKILL.md · code · | bash
Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly
README.md · code · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
Possible hardcoded credential
scripts/auto-configure-bot.js · prose · downgraded · secret:')) {
config.appSecret = line.split(
References child_process — can spawn system processes
scripts/auto-configure-bot.js · prose · downgraded · child_process
Uses exec() — may execute shell commands
scripts/auto-configure-bot.js · prose · downgraded · exec(
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
network_out Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.