ClawAudit verdict
feishu-skills-installer
feishu-skills
Downloads and installs multiple skill packages from an unspecified external source by running an installer script (install.mjs), introducing third-party code into the agent environment without visible integrity checks.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (9)
Possible hardcoded credential
feishu-fetch-doc/fetch-doc.js · prose · downgraded · token="${img.token}
Accesses system credential store
feishu-auth/token-utils.js · prose · downgraded · KEYCHAIN
Uses exec() — may execute shell commands
feishu-create-doc/create-doc.js · prose · downgraded · exec(
References child_process — can spawn system processes
feishu-docx-download/extract.js · prose · downgraded · child_process
Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly
README.md · prose · downgraded · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness
README.md · prose · downgraded · silently
Accesses sensitive environment variables
feishu-auth/token-utils.js · prose · downgraded · process.env.FEISHU_APP_SECRET
Base64 encoding/decoding
feishu-image-ocr/ocr.js · prose · downgraded · base64-encode
String.fromCharCode — can build strings to evade detection
feishu-sheet/sheet.js · prose · downgraded · String.fromCharCode
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.