Caveat verdict
gui-agent
gui-claw
GUI automation skill using screenshot-based detection; all operations are local with no credential exfiltration, behavior matches the stated automation purpose.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (9)
Pipe to python — executes piped content as Python code
benchmarks/osworld/multi_apps.md · prose · downgraded · | python
HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads
DESIGN_unified_actions.md · code · http://172.16.105.128
References sudo — requests elevated privileges
skills/gui-setup/SKILL.md · code · sudo
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
platforms/macos.md · code · subprocess.run(
Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness
actions/_actions_macos.yaml · prose · downgraded · silently
Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly
docs/README_CN.md · prose · downgraded · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
subprocess with shell=True — command injection vector
scripts/gui_agent.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True
Python os.environ.get — reads environment variable
platforms/detect.py · prose · downgraded · os.environ.get(
Python shutil file operation — copies/moves/deletes files
scripts/agent.py · prose · downgraded · shutil.copy(
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class B/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.