ClawAudit verdict

huo15-huo15-openclaw-enhance

huo15-openclaw-enhance

88
🟢 Trusted
Low risk — reviewed by ClawAudit, behavior matches stated purpose

Duplicate or alias of huo15-huo15-openclaw-enhance; same OpenClaw plugin enhancement skill with identical non-invasive hook observer behavior.

⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
100
transparency
100
maintenance

Findings (16)

Pattern match high

Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command

docs/SELF_ITERATE.md · prose · downgraded · rm -rf /

Pattern match high

References sudo — requests elevated privileges

README.md · code · sudo

Pattern match high

<script> tag in markdown — potential code injection

src/modules/bot-upload-link.ts · prose · downgraded · <script>

Pattern match high

Possible hardcoded credential

src/modules/bot-upload-link.ts · prose · downgraded · token="${token}

Pattern match high

Pipe to bash — executes piped content as shell commands

src/modules/mode-gate.ts · prose · downgraded · | bash

Pattern match high

Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands

src/modules/mode-gate.ts · prose · downgraded · | sh

Pattern match medium

Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json

Pattern match medium

References child_process — can spawn system processes

SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · child_process

Pattern match medium

Accesses .ssh directory

docs/HANDOVER.md · prose · downgraded · .ssh/

Pattern match medium

HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads

src/modules/cc-bridge-keyword-dispatch.ts · prose · downgraded · http://127.0.0.1

Pattern match medium

Uses exec() — may execute shell commands

src/modules/cc-bridge-keyword-dispatch.ts · prose · downgraded · exec(

Pattern match medium

Dynamic import() — loads module at runtime

src/modules/config-doctor.ts · prose · downgraded · import("

Pattern match low

References agent configuration files

docs/HANDOVER.md · prose · downgraded · CLAUDE.md

Pattern match low

References agent memory files

docs/lessons/2026-06-25-sdk-2026.6-ts2742-and-fabricated-ops.md · prose · downgraded · MEMORY.md

Pattern match low

Uses XMLHttpRequest — network access

src/modules/bot-upload-link.ts · prose · downgraded · XMLHttpRequest

Pattern match low

Changes file ownership

src/modules/mode-gate.ts · prose · downgraded · chown

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

Is this flag fair?

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