Caveat verdict
image-vision
image-vision-bridge
Sends images to a local Ollama API at 127.0.0.1 for vision analysis; the skill explicitly discloses this in a privacy notice and all processing is local — no data leaves the device, matching the stated purpose.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (7)
Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector
README.md · code · curl -fsSL https://ollama.com/install.sh | sh
Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands
README.md · code · | sh
Instructs covert action — may act without user awareness
SKILL.md · code · Silently
subprocess execution — runs system commands from Python
scripts/clip_snap.py · prose · downgraded · subprocess.run(
HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads
scripts/describe_image.py · prose · downgraded · http://127.0.0.1
Base64 encoding/decoding
README.md · prose · downgraded · base64-encode
Python urllib.request — network access
scripts/describe_image.py · prose · downgraded · urllib.request
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.
Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.