ClawAudit verdict
jarvis-ui
A local web dashboard for OpenClaw agents running on localhost:9999; executionSinkDetected reflects documented setup.sh/server scripts, all local — no external exfiltration or deceptive behavior present.
⚠ Flagged for review — coarse, uncorroborated signal, not a confirmed exploit. Review the config yourself before installing.
Automated static analysis — not a human review. ClawAudit flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.
Findings (9)
Opens WebSocket connection
SKILL.md · frontmatter · WebSocket
Accesses OpenClaw config/secrets directly
SKILL.md · prose · downgraded · ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
Uses exec() — may execute shell commands
public/vendor/gsap/gsap.min.js · prose · downgraded · exec(
References child_process — can spawn system processes
server/routes/schedule.js · prose · downgraded · child_process
Base64 decode (atob) — may hide malicious payloads
src/components/voice.js · prose · downgraded · atob(
Dynamic import() — loads module at runtime
src/config/config-loader.js · prose · downgraded · import('
HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads
vite.config.js · prose · downgraded · http://127.0.0.1
Accesses sensitive environment variables
server/gateway.js · prose · downgraded · process.env.JARVIS_DEVICE_AUTH
References agent memory files
server/routes/memory.js · prose · downgraded · MEMORY.md
Why the tier is capped
Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class B/D). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.
Permissions & capabilities
Requires 2 system binaries. (1 elevated: npm).
network_in Is this flag fair?
Thanks — recorded.