Caveat verdict

jl-video-downloader

88
🟢 Trusted
No high-risk patterns surfaced by the deep scan — automated capability review, not behavioral proof.

Accesses credentials AND makes external network calls

Multi-platform video downloader supporting major Chinese and international video platforms using user-supplied API keys; all operations are local file downloads consistent with the stated video downloading purpose.

Automated static analysis — not a human review. Caveat flags capabilities, not confirmed intent, and can produce false positives. Disagree with this verdict? Use Dispute below.

0
security
40
transparency
70
maintenance

What it does

These are capability combinations: each listed behavior occurs in the skill, but Caveat detects co-occurrence — it does not verify that one flows into another. Read the code to confirm a live chain.

Capability combination high

Accesses credentials AND makes external network calls — potential credential theft

LLM02 · ASI03

Capability combination high

Accesses credentials AND writes files — may persist stolen credentials locally

LLM02 · LLM06 · ASI03

Permission integrity

Makes network requests but does not declare curl/wget in required binaries

network_out

Performs file operations but does not declare file-accessing binaries

file_read+write

Code accesses API keys/tokens but declares no environment variables

credential_access

Installs packages at runtime — transitive dependencies are not auditable

package_install

Findings (9)

Pattern match critical

Possible hardcoded credential

SKILL.md · code · API_KEY="sk-your-siliflow-api-key

Pattern match critical

Pipe-to-shell pattern (curl | sh) — supply chain attack vector

SKILL.md · code · curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh

Pattern match critical

Pipe to sh — executes piped content as shell commands

SKILL.md · code · | sh

Pattern match critical

Recursive delete from root or home — destructive command

SKILL.md · code · rm -rf ~

Pattern match high

HTTP request to bare IP address — common in malicious payloads

SKILL.md · code · http://127.0.0.1

Pattern match high

Accesses shell history/config

SKILL.md · code · ~/.zshrc

Pattern match high

References sudo — requests elevated privileges

SKILL.md · code · sudo

Pattern match high

apt-get install — installs system packages

SKILL.md · code · apt-get install

Pattern match high

yum install — installs system packages

SKILL.md · code · yum install

Why the tier is capped

Execution sink present in raw bytes (Hard Floor: class A/B). Final tier capped at Caution — cannot be lifted by any downgrade, example-payload opt-in, or allowlist.

Permissions & capabilities

No declared permissions — minimal attack surface.

credential_accessfile_writenetwork_outpackage_install
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